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ABSTRACT
The water crisis that has embroiled Flint, Michigan, since 2014 is often explained via the proximate causes
of government oversight and punitive emergency management. While these were critical elements in the
decision to switch the city’s water source, many other forces helped precipitate the crisis. One such force has
been an enduring support for Charles Tiebout’s model of interlocal competition, through which a region is
presumed stronger when fragmented, independent municipalities compete for residents and investment.
However, the Tiebout model fails to account for spillover effects, particularly regarding questions of social
and regional equity. In this sense, the fragmentation of the Flint metropolitan region—supported through a
variety of housing and land use policies over many decades—created the conditions through which suburbs
were absolved of responsibility for Flint’s decades-long economic crisis. Because of the Tiebout model’s
inability to address imbalances in population shifts arising from disparities in municipal services, Flint’s
more affluent suburbs continued to prosper, while Flint grew poorer and experienced infrastructure decline.
Underlying this pattern of inequality has been a long history of racial segregation and massive deindustri-
alization, which concentrated the region’s black population in the economically depressed central city. The
Flint Water Crisis is thus a classic example of an environmental injustice, as policies were set in motion,
which led to the creation of a politically separate and majority-black municipality with concentrated poverty,
while nearby municipalities—most of them overwhelmingly white—accepted little responsibility for the
legacy costs created by the region’s starkly uneven patterns of metropolitan development.
Keywords: urban planning; social justice; public health; lead poisoning; land use; Tiebout Model
INTRODUCTION
S ince the spring of 2014, residents of the hard luckcity of Flint, Michigan, have experienced a toxic
lead-in-water catastrophe rooted simultaneously in con-
temporary government malfeasance and the city’s long
and complex history of inequality. The crisis formally
began in April 2014, when a state-appointed emergency
manager and staff—in a bid to cut costs in this financially
strapped city—opted to use the highly corrosive Flint
River as the city’s water source without implementing
proper corrosion control, causing lead and other dan-
gerous contaminants from the city’s aging water pipes to
leach into the water supply.1 Investigations conducted in
the wake of the citywide lead exposure leave little room
Dr. Sadler is an assistant professor in the Division of Public
Health, Michigan State University, Flint, Michigan. Dr. High-
smith is an assistant professor in the Department of History,
University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California.
1Mark Brush, et al. ‘‘TIMELINE: Here’s How the Flint Water
Crisis Unfolded.’’ Michigan Radio, 21 December 2015. <http://
michiganradio.org/post/timeline-heres-how-flint-water-crisis-
unfolded#stream/0>. (Last accessed on July 18, 2016); Mona
Hanna-Attisha, et al. ‘‘Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children
Associated with the Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial
Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response.’’ American
Journal of Public Health 106 (2016): 283–290; Jeremy C.F.
Lin, Jean Rutter, and Haeyoun Park. ‘‘Events That Led to
Flint’s Water Crisis.’’ The New York Times, 21 January 2016.
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for doubt that the Flint Water Crisis (FWC) is, in large
measure, a product of severe government mismanage-
ment.2
In reality, though, the tangled roots of the FWC also
stretch back deep into the twentieth century, long before
the city’s emergency managers elected to change the
public water source. Over the past three-quarters of a
century, a harsh mix of disinvestment, ‘‘white flight,’’
metropolitan political fragmentation, and persistent racial
discrimination transformed this once economically vi-
brant although deeply divided city into one of the poor-
est, most racially segregated metropolitan regions in the
United States. In the end, these forces decimated the local
tax base and eroded the city’s infrastructure, thus setting
the stage for the state’s 2011 takeover of the municipal
government and the ensuing FWC.3
An examination of the long history leading up to the
FWC points to the harmful legacies of Charles M.
Tiebout’s influential model of metropolitan fragmenta-
tion and interlocal competition. During the middle de-
cades of the twentieth century, as Flint was gaining
stature as a manufacturing hub of the General Motors
Corporation (GM), tens of thousands of white city
dwellers ‘‘voted with their feet,’’ as Tiebout expected
and hoped they would, and departed Flint for new fron-
tiers in suburbia. Once ensconced in their new commu-
nities, white suburbanites created new independent
governments, resisted affiliations with Flint and its peo-
ple—particularly African Americans and the poor—and
insulated themselves from the urban economic crisis that
ultimately precipitated the FWC. Although Tiebout’s
model was (and remains) popular among many policy-
makers and ordinary suburbanites, its implementation has
consistently hardened social inequalities and thwarted
efforts to provide basic public services in cities such as
Flint.4
The FWC is, in many ways, a culminating event in the
city’s decades-long urban crisis. Although this public
health disaster has largely unfolded within the city of
Flint, the origins of the calamity are thoroughly metro-
politan in nature. Our intention here is to provide a his-
torical case study of the social and land use policies that
led to the FWC, one that demonstrates the pernicious
effects of metropolitan fragmentation and sprawl driven
by political parochialism, persistent racial antagonism,
and a lack of economic diversification.
The Tiebout model within the Flint context
The Tiebout model asserts that metropolitan regions
are best constituted by a range of competing municipal-
ities offering different taxing systems and service pack-
ages. Within this market-based framework, individual
residents or businesses are left to choose and invest in the
communities that best suit their needs.5 The logic behind
Tiebout’s model is that small units of government en-
courage competitive efficiency and reduce individual
losses associated with the distribution of goods and ser-
vices over large areas.6
The functional effect of this model of governance is a
metropolitan region fragmented into many competing
units of government. Were geographically separate
governance and exacerbated sprawl the only outcomes,7
social justice advocates may have fewer objections to the
Tiebout model. However, the idea that vote-with-your-feet
politics preserves free choice for everyone is inaccurate
because few municipalities compete for the socially or
economically marginalized,8 who are simultaneously often
the least mobile, and thus find themselves disproportion-
ately concentrated in high-need, low-tax base municipali-
ties in the older urban core or impoverished inner-ring
suburbs.9
In fact, scholars have repeatedly shown that the frag-
mentation of metropolitan areas perpetuates segregation
and racial and economic inequality at both municipal10
and school district levels.11 Furthermore, members of
2Flint Water Advisory Task Force. ‘‘Final Report.’’ March 21,
2016. <https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_
FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf>. (Last accessed
on July 18, 2016).
3Andrew R. Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress: Flint,
Michigan, and the Fate of the American Metropolis (University
of Chicago Press, 2015); Andrew R. Highsmith. ‘‘Failing Flint.’’
Los Angeles Times, 27 January 2016.
4Michael Howell Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis 50
Years Later: Lessons and Lingering Challenges for Metropolitan
Governance in the 21st century.’’ Public Administration Review
68 (2008): 97–109; Charles M. Tiebout. ‘‘A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures.’’ The Journal of Political Economy 64
(1956): 416–424.
5Pillsung Byun and Adrian X. Esparza. ‘‘A Revisionist Model
of Suburbanization and Sprawl: The Role of Political Frag-
mentation, Growth Control, and Spillovers.’’ Journal of Plan-
ning Education and Research 24 (2005): 252–264; John I.
Carruthers. ‘‘Growth at the Fringe: The Influence of Political
Fragmentation in United States Metropolitan Areas.’’ Papers in
Regional Science 82 (2003): 475–499; Tiebout. ‘‘A Pure The-
ory.’’ 416–424.
6Howell-Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis.’’
7Byun and Esparza. ‘‘A Revisionist Model.’’
8Dennis C. Mueller. ‘‘Achieving the Just Polity.’’ The
American Economic Review 64 (1974): 147–152.
9Myron Orfield. American Metropolitics: The New Suburban
Reality (Brookings Institution Press, 2002).
10Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, David Lowery, and William E.
Lyons. ‘‘Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Ghettos:
Some Empirical Observations on Institutional Racism.’’ Journal
of Urban Affairs 13 (1991): 479–493; David M.P. Freund. Co-
lored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Sub-
urban America (University of Chicago Press, 2007); Richard
Child Hill. ‘‘Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in
the Metropolis.’’ American Political Science Review 68 (1974):
1557–1568.
11For a sampling of this scholarship, see Jennifer B. Ayscue
and Gary Orfield. ‘‘School District Lines Stratify Educational
Opportunity by Race and Poverty.’’ Race and Social Problems 7
(2015): 5–20; Kendra Bischoff. ‘‘School District Fragmentation
and Racial Residential Segregation: How Do Boundaries Mat-
ter?’’ Urban Affairs Review 44 (2008): 182–217; Erica Fran-
kenberg. ‘‘Splintering School Districts: Understanding the Link
between Segregation and Fragmentation.’’ Law & Social Inquiry
34 (2009): 869–909; Jennifer Jellison Holme and Kara S. Fin-
nigan. ‘‘School Diversity, School District Fragmentation, and
Metropolitan Policy.’’ Teachers College Record 115 (2013): 1–
29; Gary Orfield. Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and Na-
tional Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 1978).
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minority communities in fragmented metropolitan areas
tend to exhibit poorer economic and health outcomes
than their white peers.12 Such inequality is not purely a
function of economic distress, though, as white racism
and public policy support for suburbanization have in-
dependent effects on both individual city dwellers and
broad patterns of ‘‘urban decline.’’13 Moreover, sprawl
itself has been pegged as a critical but sometimes over-
looked issue for civil rights and social justice advocates
to consider when addressing issues of concentrated
poverty and disadvantage.14
Thus, with its myopic view of efficiency and individ-
ual responsibility, the Tiebout model fails to account for
a variety of socially inequitable spillover effects.15
Tiebout’s framework also elides the central role of gov-
ernment in producing (and reproducing) inequality. As
other scholars have shown, the process of racial and class
sorting afforded by federal housing policies promoting
suburbanization helped to fragment metropolitan areas,
leading to more concentrated poverty in inner-city
communities of color and more sprawl in outlying,
majority-white areas.16 Moreover, residents isolated in
low-need/low-tax municipalities do not pay the true cost
of regional service provision, thus creating a price dis-
tortion.17 What were once underdeveloped semirural ar-
eas have, in many cases, been built up into affluent,
overwhelmingly white suburbs with an artificial sense of
prosperity. In assessing the roots of these metropolitan
divides, the contributions of federal housing policy can-
not be overstated. Indeed, from the creation of the Fed-
eral Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 to the era of
fair housing reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
millions of Americans—all but a tiny fraction of them
white—benefitted from government-backed loans for
new suburban housing.18
Because of these policies, regions with high levels of
metropolitan fragmentation have a built-in environmental
injustice due to racial segregation, unequal tax bases, and
uneven service provision. In addition, as other scholars
have concluded, municipal fragmentation unnecessarily
complicates the provision and administration of physical
infrastructure such as water and sewer systems.19
As we demonstrate in the paragraphs to follow, met-
ropolitan Flint—a region exhibiting high levels of socio-
economic segregation and metropolitan fragmentation—is
a classic example of the equity problems inherent in the
Tiebout model. Throughout this article, we show how the
state-sponsored employment of metropolitan fragmenta-
tion, spurred by notions of personal responsibility and
racially motivated fears of integration, contributed to the
environmental injustice now present in Flint. In Figure 1,
we present an original framework, entitled ‘‘The Causal
Chain of the Flint Water Crisis,’’ for navigating through
five transitional periods in Flint’s history. Our analysis of
these five periods, which match the five subsections of the
article to follow, illustrates how major events in the city’s
history combined to pave the way for the FWC. The
framework itself grew out of historical research conducted
by the authors and inspired by numerous other scholars
cited below. The transitional periods within the framework
correspond to major changes in development patterns,
social and land use policies, and investment practices that
directly influenced Flint’s trajectory. These include the
following: Industrial Growth (and the accompanying
sprawl, racial segregation, and rapid urban development),
Post-World War II Development (and the ensuing mass
suburbanization that reshaped metropolitan areas), New
Flint and Regionalism (and the emboldening of suburbs
against the center city), Civil Rights and Deindustrializa-
tion (and the reshaping of the local economy), and Con-
temporary Disinvestment (and the fiscal crisis it created).
HISTORICAL STAGES LEADING TO THE FWC
Industrial growth: sprawl, segregation,
and rapid urban development
Flint’s recent history of environmental injustice dates
to the growth of the automobile industry before World
War II. As the population soared through the 1910s and
1920s due to a massive influx of job-seeking migrants
from the American South, the Flint community expanded
its use of explicitly racist housing practices to keep the
African American population separate from white
neighborhoods.20 Within the city, rigid forms of racial
segregation (many of them rooted in public policies)
relegated thousands of black families to overcrowded,
polluted, and dilapidated neighborhoods near GM
12Casey J. Dawkins. ‘‘Tiebout Choice and Residential Seg-
regation by Race in US Metropolitan Areas, 1980–2000.’’ Re-
gional Science and Urban Economics 35 (2005): 734–755;
Andre´ Malo Hutson, et al. ‘‘Metropolitan Fragmentation and
Health Disparities: Is There a Link?’’ Milbank Quarterly 90
(2012): 187–207.
13Colin Gordon. Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of
the American City (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008);
Andrew R. Highsmith. ‘‘Decline and Renewal in North Amer-
ican Cities.’’ Journal of Urban History 37 (2011): 619–626.
14John Powell. ‘‘Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl: Access to
Opportunities through Regional Strategies.’’ Forum for Social
Economics 28 (1999): 1–20.
15Byun and Esparza. ‘‘A Revisionist Model’’; Howell-
Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis.’’
16Freund. Colored Property; Kenneth T. Jackson. Crabgrass
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (Oxford
University Press, 1985); Thomas J. Sugrue. The Origins of the
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton
University Press, 1996).
17Howell-Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis.’’
18Lorrie A. Frasure. ‘‘Beyond the Myth of the White
Middle-Class: Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Settlement in
Suburban America.’’ In: Georgia A. Persons, ed., The Ex-
panding Boundaries of Black Politics (Transaction Publish-
ers, 2011); Freund, Colored Property; Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier.
19Howard Frumkin, Lawrence Frank, and Richard J. Jackson.
Urban Sprawl and Public Health: Designing, Planning, and
Building for Healthy Communities (Island Press, 2004); Hutson,
et al. ‘‘Metropolitan Fragmentation.’’
20Peirce F. Lewis. ‘‘Impact of Negro Migration on the Elec-
toral Geography of Flint, Michigan, 1932–1962: A Cartographic
Analysis.’’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers
55 (1965): 1–25.
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factories, particularly in the city’s North End. Many poor
whites settled outside of the city in politically weak
suburban townships, where land was cheap, neighbor-
hoods were virtually all white, and modern amenities
such as sewers, running water, and electricity were often
absent. In fact, the lack of infrastructure outside the Flint
city limits meant that most suburbs were initially redlined
by local banks and federal housing officials alongside
majority-black neighborhoods in the city.21
Rapid growth within the city rested to a considerable
degree on racial segregation and the separation of os-
tensibly incompatible land uses. Thus, many middle-
class white neighborhoods—where favorable mortgages
could be procured—grew up apart from both underde-
veloped working-class white suburbs and majority-black
urban neighborhoods. GM was also responsible for
maintaining segregation. Between 1919 and 1933, the
company constructed 3000 new white-only housing units
on Flint’s west side.22
Throughout this pre-World War II era, the city con-
tinued to grow and modernize its services, while subur-
ban areas suffered from poor infrastructure and political
underdevelopment. In a lending system, in which mort-
gages tended to follow sewer lines,23 most new housing
starts occurred within segregated neighborhoods inside
Flint. Further aggravating these metropolitan imbalances,
the massive speculative subdivision of tens of thousands
of suburban lots meant that Flint could not service all
outlying areas with their existing system.24 In 1948,
public health researchers found that the area’s uneven
patterns of development were leading to huge public
health disparities between white urban neighborhoods
and suburban or black urban neighborhoods.25
FIG. 1. The causal chain of the Flint Water Crisis.
21Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 37–53.
22Ibid., 31–32.
23Ibid., 45–53, 103–120.
24Andrew R. Highsmith. ‘‘Demolition Means Progress: Flint,
Michigan, and the Deconstruction of the American Dream,’’
(PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2009), 230–231.
25Leonard M. Board and Herbert J. Dunsmore. ‘‘Environ-
mental Health Problems Related to Urban Decentralization—As
Observed in a Typical Metropolitan Community.’’ American
Journal of Public Health 38 (1948): 986–996.
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Post-World War II development: mass
suburbanization, fragmentation, and crisis
In the years following World War II, underserviced,
sprawling, unincorporated suburban municipalities faced
intense pressure to modernize their services to match
Flint’s well-developed infrastructure, especially as local
citizens demanded improved living conditions and fed-
eral housing officials became more amenable to subsi-
dizing growth in well-serviced suburbs. As the city’s
economy boomed, many more white families (some with
an explicit antiurban bias) moved to the suburbs, often
with the false expectation of urban amenities such as
water and sewer lines. During the 1940s and 1950s, these
suburban migrations precipitated several major health
and infrastructure crises. In 1947, suburban Carman
Creek overflowed with untreated sewage, creating a
public health emergency.26 Concerns also arose over
impending suburban water shortages and were ultimately
realized when the suburb of Flushing ran out of water in
1954.27 By 1956, suburban governments had invested
millions of dollars in new water infrastructure (serving
one-third of the county’s population) and suburban mu-
nicipalities continued their push to modernize to attract
new FHA-backed mortgages.
As the city became more densely packed and corporate
investment and manufacturing processes evolved, GM
began eyeing the suburbs around Flint for new industrial
development.28 The siting of factories in suburbs gener-
ated a great deal of territoriality in suburban Flint, as site
location practices implicitly chose winners and losers in
the metropolitan economic landscape. Furthermore, al-
though GM was of paramount importance to the local
economy, its success made Flint the least economically
diversified region in the nation—a fact that would ulti-
mately have momentous consequences for the city’s fu-
ture.29 Viewing Flint’s leaders as opportunistically
seeking to annex new factories, growing suburban mu-
nicipalities and school districts sought to retain the tax
base for themselves and thus strengthened their antiurban
resolve.30
Recognizing the need to retain GM’s regional invest-
ment, Flint’s municipal leaders began providing water
and other services to several suburban areas, especially
for industrial land uses. While the expectation was to
incorporate these areas into the central city, the imme-
diate effect was to subsidize further suburban migration.
Massive growth in demand by the late 1950s forced the
city to reconsider this policy, with the idea of a regional
government eventually proposed as a solution to the
service problem.31
In the end, industrial sprawl further disadvantaged
Flint’s black residents, most of whom remained locked
in the center city, increasingly distant from jobs, and
overlooked in the development of new infrastructure.
While the suburbs no longer experienced redlining,
continued disinvestment from core urban areas and ex-
plicitly racial redlining further diminished land values
and living conditions in majority-black neighborhoods in
the city.32
New Flint and regionalism: suburbs versus the city
During the late 1950s, Flint’s civic leaders, including
representatives of GM, proposed a solution to the area’s
uneven metropolitan development by recommending a
regional government called New Flint, primarily to
coordinate service provision and growth. Yet, because
of the tremendous tax burdens that the suburbs had re-
cently incurred through the construction of new infra-
structure, many suburbanites developed a ‘‘fiercely
independent political consciousness.’’33 Ushering in an
era within Michigan marked by the rejection of regional
governance and the triumph of the Tiebout philoso-
phy,34 suburban voters strongly opposed this proposal—
and the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in their favor in
195835—steering a course toward deindustrialization
and sociopolitical fragmentation that ultimately led to
Flint’s 2011 financial emergency and the subsequent
water crisis.
These fights to develop infrastructure and retain local
government control emboldened suburban residents to
adopt new, more parochial identities throughout the
1960s and 1970s. Thus, although it was already well
known among social scientists that political fragmenta-
tion was inefficient, depressed regional housing markets,
and diminished public health, suburban leaders flouted
such ideas and sought to retain autonomy above all else
to protect segregation and the system of resource and
26Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 107–108.
27A collection of quotations from Highsmith’s dissertation
illustrate water-related crises experienced in the underdeveloped
suburbs of metropolitan Flint during the middle decades of the
20th century. Notably, there is a great deal of similarity between
the complaints of mid-century suburbanites and the contempo-
rary exclamations of exasperated community members in Flint.
There is also a similarity between the logistical struggles faced
by local elected officials in both periods. The quotes regarding
mid-century water crises include: ‘‘Homeowners not so silently
fumed about foul tasting.water’’; ‘‘The poor water quali-
ty.shocked public health officials.[and] sickened untold
numbers’’; ‘‘[Council members] implemented Operation Tan-
ker, a plan to purchase and transport water.[and] workers la-
bored around the clock to deliver.water to thirsty customers’’;
‘‘Whole communities are concerned about an adequate water
supply’’; and ‘‘These emergencies forced.governing bodies to
develop expensive new urban infrastructure projects.’’ See
Highsmith. ‘‘Demolition Means Progress’’ 280–285. It is in-
structive to note that, after World War II, such attitudes fostered
an anti-urban bias against the city, as suburbs scrambled to
develop their own independent infrastructures.
28Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 121–134.
29Allan Rodgers. ‘‘Some Aspects of Industrial Diversification
in the United States.’’ Economic Geography 33 (1957): 16–30.
30Charles Tilly. Durable Inequality (University of California
Press, 1999); Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 103–144.
31Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 121–144.
32Ibid., 45–53, 147–199.
33Ibid., 104.
34Benedict S. Jimenez and Rebecca Hendrick. ‘‘Is Govern-
ment Consolidation the Answer?’’ State and Local Government
Review 42 (2010): 258–270.
35Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 140.
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opportunity hoarding common to Tieboutian thinking.36
Pursuant to the failure of New Flint, civic leaders
attempted to recapture lost tax revenue by selectively
attempting to annex outlying factories and sprawling
business strips in the growing suburbs. In response, res-
idents of one township incorporated as a city in 1972, and
others banded together to introduce state legislation to
protect ‘‘charter’’ townships from urban annexation. The
enactment of a 1978 bill known as HB 4030 gave
townships the same legal powers as central cities, so long
as basic tax base and public service criteria were met.37
An attorney working for a suburban township insisted
that amalgamation constituted an ‘‘injustice’’ for the
township due to their recent infrastructure investments,
although he failed to acknowledge the history of Flint
providing services to said suburbs and the fact that the
very existence of the suburbs was linked to the rising
economic fortunes of the city. Suburbanites maintained
that if Flint’s leaders desired new development, they
should clear built-up land in the city.
In the wake of the defeat of New Flint and subsequent
annexation attempts, Flint and its people found them-
selves up against a wall of hostile suburbs,38 unable to
expand the city’s boundaries while simultaneously
hemorrhaging tax base to outlying areas. As an economic
strategy, during this period, Flint’s mayor and city
commissioners considered proposals to attract additional
industry to impoverished black residential neighbor-
hoods, a process of urban renewal that began in the early
1960s but carried more weight after the failed consoli-
dation and annexation attempts.39 Over time, this clear-
ance of black neighborhoods would have profound
implications for population shifts, racial and economic
inequality, and tax base decline.
Civil rights and deindustrialization: social
and economic change exacerbates
fragmented governance
Civil rights efforts for open housing had a com-
pounding effect on antiurban feelings among whites in
the suburbs. Flint enacted a municipal fair housing or-
dinance in 1968.40 Shortly after that, federal legislators
passed the national Fair Housing Act, which prohibited
most forms of racially motivated housing discrimination.
In Flint and elsewhere, however, the political and juris-
dictional separation of the suburbs placed limits on such
civil rights gains, as outlying suburban municipalities
retained many discriminatory housing and zoning prac-
tices that excluded both poor and black residents. The
constriction of Flint by its suburbs—along with local
officials’ desire to grow the tax base in a city that was
increasingly losing middle-class residents to those sub-
urbs—precipitated the city’s turn toward urban renewal
for new industrial and commercial land.41
The destructive and competitive nature of Tiebout’s
philosophy surfaced dramatically during this era. In the
1960s and early 1970s, government authorities worked to
secure new investment by approving the construction of a
new urban freeway and designating more than 1000 acres
of predominately black residential neighborhoods for
clearance. The particularly grave injustice in this process
was that because of delays in approving the city’s rede-
velopment plans, land values in renewal neighborhoods
declined precipitously, leaving home and business own-
ers ill-compensated for their properties. The effect was
the displacement and dispossession of thousands of pre-
dominately black Flint residents, many of whom had
been property owners. This displacement also sped up
white flight to the suburbs as the black population spilled
over into previously segregated white enclaves within the
city.42
Blockbusting by real estate agents and fears of racial
conflict fueled the departure of thousands of white fam-
ilies from the city in the 1960s and 1970s.43 In this era of
massive displacement, suburbanites sought to re-
establish the color line by isolating themselves in polit-
ically separate municipalities. Meanwhile, real estate
agents steered black families into racially transitional
neighborhoods within Flint. Before the enactment of the
Fair Housing Act, whites in Flint could buffer themselves
from integration through explicitly racist means. After
1968, however, suburbanites increasingly embraced ex-
clusionary zoning and building codes, home rule, and
other ostensibly colorblind practices that in reality per-
petuated exclusion along lines of both race and class.44
Once in separate municipalities, suburbanites felt
functionally absolved from the legacy infrastructure and
social problems they had helped to create,45 opting in-
stead to develop duplicated infrastructures (as noted
above). Howell-Moroney notes that such ‘‘boundaries
serve to artificially circumscribe notions of collective
responsibility.’’46 This was certainly the case in the Flint
area during the postwar and civil rights eras, when
36George Lipsitz. ‘‘From Plessy to Ferguson.’’ Cultural Cri-
tique 90 (2015): 119–139; Tilly. Durable Inequality.
37Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 141–144, 243–245.
38Ibid., 141–144.
39Sidney Fine. ‘‘Michigan and Housing Discrimination,
1949–1968.’’ The Michigan Historical Review 23 (1997): 81–
114; Thomas C. Henthorn. ‘‘A Catholic Dilemma: White Flight
in Northwest Flint.’’ The Michigan Historical Review 31 (2005):
1–42.
40Fine. ‘‘Michigan and Housing Discrimination’’; Highsmith.
Demolition Means Progress, 147–199.
41Other scholars have made this point. See, for example,
Robert O. Self. American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for
Postwar Oakland (Princeton University Press, 2003).
42Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 175–199.
43Richard Casey Sadler and Don Lafreniere. ‘‘Racist Housing
Practices as a Precursor to Uneven Neighborhood Change in a
Post-Industrial City.’’ Housing Studies (2016); DOI: 10.1080/
02673037.2016.1181724.
44Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 216–221; Hutson,
et al. ‘‘Metropolitan Fragmentation’’; Sacoby Wilson, Malo
Hutson, and Mahasin Mujahid. ‘‘How Planning and Zoning
Contribute to Inequitable Development, Neighborhood Health,
and Environmental Injustice.’’ Environmental Justice 1 (2008):
211–216.
45Discussed for gentrifying cities in Powell. ‘‘Race, Poverty,
and Urban Sprawl,’’ 1–20.
46Howell-Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis.’’
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suburbanites resisted desegregation and increasingly
severed their ties to the city.47
Deindustrialization hit Flint particularly hard during the
late twentieth century. Because Flint’s economy rested
heavily on the production of large, energy-inefficient
automobiles, the energy crises and economic recessions
of the 1970s and 1980s dealt the city particularly devas-
tating blows. As GM executives ordered layoffs and plant
closures, the city went into an economic tailspin. Between
1955 and 1987, Flint lost 34,000 jobs.48 In the wake of
these economic setbacks, municipalities in the metropol-
itan region fought over increasingly shrinking slices of an
economic pie, as each sought to retain the quality of in-
frastructure constructed during the boom years.
Contemporary disinvestment: punitive measures,
antiurban bias, and fiscal crises
Alongside joblessness and poverty, property aban-
donment and rising fears of crime created additional
disincentives to remain in Flint. Between 1960 and 2015,
the city’s population dropped from nearly 200,000 to
below 100,000.49 With its ability to grow inhibited by
incorporated suburbs, and its own population and eco-
nomic base shrinking, Flint’s financial position increas-
ingly worsened during the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. Each household and business that
moved away made the situation more precarious. Due in
large measure to declining revenue, Flint was thus unable
to sustain its infrastructure, despite charging increasingly
high rates for water and other basic services.50 Moreover,
deliberate disinvestment in cities by the state government
only hastened the fiscal crisis that led to state takeovers,
first in 2002, and more recently in 2011.
Rather than creating a pro-business local economic
development climate, the state of Michigan enacted a
pair of punitive measures that exacerbated Flint’s finan-
cial and infrastructural woes. Embracing a Tieboutian
approach to the distribution of government funds, in
2003, the Michigan legislature sharply reduced revenue
sharing with municipalities, from $900 million to $250
million annually.51 The revenue sharing arrangement had
previously positioned central cities as the major eco-
nomic drivers of regional economies. Due to this change,
however, Flint lost $54.9 million between 2003 and
2014. Reflecting on Flint’s 2012 deficit of $19.2 million,
one writer pointed out that with the lost revenue sharing
funds, ‘‘Flint could eliminate the deficit and pay off all
$30 million of bonded indebtedness and still have over
$5 million in surplus.’’52
Exacerbating matters, a punitive new emergency
manager law enacted in 2011 (PA 4) allowed state offi-
cials to take over municipal finances with the central di-
rective to cut spending.53 Although Michigan voters
overturned PA 4 in 2012, the Michigan legislature moved
quickly to enact a replacement law (PA 436), which
strengthened the powers of emergency managers and pro-
hibited referenda on the issue.54 Flint was under emergency
financial management throughout the 3-year period leading
up to the FWC, due in considerable measure to these re-
ductions in revenue sharing. As critics have noted, the cit-
izens who have experienced these state takeovers since
2009 constitute just 9.7% of the state population but 49.8%
of its black population.55 Given both the known negative
consequences of municipal fragmentation and Michigan’s
practice of punishing rather than aiding struggling munic-
ipalities through the revocation of revenue sharing and the
institution of emergency managers, it is not surprising that
the FWC was the end result of this process.
CONCLUSIONS
The full story of the proximate causes of the FWC has
been told elsewhere56; instead, we have focused here on the
deeper historical causes of the catastrophe and how they
relate to and reflect many of the inequities perpetuated by
Tieboutian policies. As we have argued here, and as Fig-
ure 1 illustrates, many forces converged to generate the
social and economic conditions that brought about Flint’s
infrastructure crisis. Paramount among them is the rigid
segregation of the city’s black population, first explicitly via
federal and local housing and development policies and
later implicitly by fragmented municipal governance. Re-
searchers have routinely shown that this process of sorting
into different municipalities as advocated in the Tiebout
model has disproportionately harsh effects on minority
47Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress. Much the same
occurred in other metropolitan areas in the United States. See,
for example, Kevin M. Kruse. White Flight: Atlanta and the
Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton University Press,
2005).
48Highsmith Demolition Means Progress, 242–267.
49‘‘Flint, Michigan Population History.’’ <http://www.
biggestuscities.com/city/flint-michigan>. (Last accessed on
July 18, 2016).
50Highsmith. Demolition Means Progress, 242–285; High-
smith. ‘‘Failing Flint’’; John Wisely. ‘‘Flint Residents Paid
America’s Highest Water Rates.’’ Detroit Free Press 17 Feb-
ruary 2016.
51Anthony Minghine. ‘‘The Great Revenue Sharing Heist.’’
Michigan Municipal League Review, March/April 2014.
52Jonathan Oosting. ‘‘Michigan’s $6.2B ‘Raid’ on Revenue
Sharing? See How Much Local Communities Have Lost since
2003.’’ Lansing News, 18 March 2014.
53Monica Davey. ‘‘Michigan Residents Sue over Law on
Emergency Management of Struggling Cities.’’ The New York
Times, 23 June 2011; Jamie Peck. ‘‘Austerity Urbanism:
American Cities under Extreme Economy.’’ City 16 (2012):
626–655.
54John Philo. ‘‘Local Government in Michigan: Democracy
for the Fortunate Few.’’ National Lawyers Guild Review 71
(2014): 65.
55David Fasenfest and Theodore Pride. ‘‘Emergency Man-
agement in Michigan: Race, Class and the Limits of Liberal
Democracy.’’ Critical Sociology 42 (2016): 331–334.
56Jennifer Dixon. ‘‘How Flint’s Water Crisis Unfolded.’’
Detroit Free Press, 20 January 2016; Flint Water Advisory Task
Force. ‘‘Final Report’’; Merit Kennedy. ‘‘Lead-Laced Water in
Flint: A Step-by-Step Look at the Makings of a Crisis.’’ Na-
tional Public Radio, 20 April 2016. <http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-
flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis>. (Last ac-
cessed on July 20, 2016).
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populations. In the Flint case, Tiebout-style sorting resulted
in a deeply inequitable arrangement in which suburban-
ites—the overwhelming majority of whom were white—
effectively deeded over the central city with the most legacy
infrastructure to a disproportionately poor and minority
population that had already suffered from decades of dis-
investment and discrimination.
Compellingly, in 2016, the governor’s task force itself
found that ‘‘the facts of the Flint water crisis lead us to
the inescapable conclusion that this is a case of envi-
ronmental injustice.’’ As members of that task force
further asserted, when it comes to determining whether
an environmental injustice has occurred, intent is of little
consequence.57 Rather, these sorts of injustices take place
when discrete communities—often those populated by
poor people or racial minorities, as in the Flint case—are
saddled with disproportionately high environmental
burdens, regardless of intent.
Nevertheless, with regard to the Flint story, a measure of
intent is clearly decipherable. As we have shown, many
policies in Flint reflected a deliberate intent to fragment the
metropolis and disinvest in the central city, which in turn
created concentrated disadvantage for minority residents
and the poor. That disadvantage manifested itself not only
in high rates of urban poverty and racial segregation but
also in the urban fiscal and infrastructural crises that have
collided so powerfully since 2014. In short, much of the
environmental injustice that has occurred as a result of the
FWC was avoidable.
In 1969, a black Flint city commissioner offered the
following warning to fleeing white residents: ‘‘Those of you
who feel you will escape by running to suburbia, be-
ware.blight recognizes no border lines.’’58 In the decades
since then, the steep costs of suburbanization and metro-
politan fragmentation have become exceedingly apparent,
not only in the Flint area but in the nation as a whole. As
Jimenez and Hendrick concluded, ‘‘low-density and spa-
tially expansive development patterns require large invest-
ments to extend roadways and other types of infrastructure-
related services over long distances to reach communities in
the urban fringes.’’59 Thus, the Flint metropolitan region
faces a precarious long-term situation, as both urban and
suburban obsolescence may precipitate further infrastruc-
ture or financial crises—scenarios for which fragmented
municipal governments are currently ill prepared.
Given the vast scale of environmental injustice in cities
such as Flint, policymakers in Michigan and elsewhere
would be prudent to evaluate how their emphasis on sub-
urban growth has exacerbated the disadvantages of low-
income and often minority populations. Municipal frag-
mentation has been a convenient tool for perpetuating the
illusion of separate but equal in racially heterogeneous
metropolitan regions,60 but persistent social inequalities as
well as the aging infrastructure of urban and, more recently,
suburban municipalities will continue to pose threats to
public health and well-being in the future.
While solutions exist for these problems, many remain
politically unpalatable to governing elites, many of whom
continue unwittingly to favor the Tiebout model. One such
proposal is a hybrid form of regional governance known as
federated regionalism. According to Powell, ‘‘federated
regionalism is a regional approach that preserves political
and cultural status within communities or cities, while
sharing regional resources and responsibilities, and bal-
anced regional policymaking.’’ ‘‘This approach,’’ Powell
contends, ‘‘provides the opportunity to preserve and build
on the assets of the inner city community while tapping
into the resources and opportunities located elsewhere in
the region.’’61 As a practical matter, this policy proposal
may be difficult to achieve politically since it would ul-
timately entail the resurrection of some form of revenue
sharing. Additional partial solutions may include stricter
enforcement of fair housing laws; dense urban develop-
ment with a range of housing types and costs; a renewed
emphasis on school desegregation and consolidation; the
prioritization of transportation, public health, and infra-
structure investments in existing urban areas; policy
changes to address wealth and employment imbalances
between impoverished urban and suburban areas and more
affluent suburban job centers; and community economic
development programs to encourage more equitable and
socially advantageous forms of urban redevelopment.62
If policymakers in Michigan and elsewhere are serious
about addressing social and environmental injustices and
improving the economic competitiveness of central cities,
they must act decisively and in ways that deviate from
Michigan’s (and the nation’s) antiurban past. In the ab-
sence of such a major shift, residents of metropolitan
57Flint Water Advisory Task Force. ‘‘Final Report.’’
58Highsmith. ‘‘Demolition Means Progress,’’ 453–454.
59Jimenez and Hendrick. ‘‘Government Consolidation,’’ 264.
See also Robert W. Burchell. South Carolina Infrastructure
Study: Projection of Statewide Infrastructure Costs, 1995–2015
(Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1997);
Helen F. Ladd and John Yinger. America’s Ailing Cities: Fiscal
Health and the Design of Urban Policy ( John Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1989).
60DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons. ‘‘Metropolitan Fragmenta-
tion’’; Freund. Colored Property; N.E. Long. ‘‘Political Science
and the City.’’ In: Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin, eds., Urban
Research and Policy Planning (Sage Publications, 1967), 243–
262.
61Powell. ‘‘Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl,’’ 8.
62Julian Agyeman and Tom Evans. ‘‘Toward Just Sustainability
in Urban Communities: Building Equity Rights with Sustainable
Solutions.’’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 590 (2003): 35–53; Elizabeth Burton. ‘‘Housing for
an Urban Renaissance: Implications for Social Equity.’’ Housing
Studies 18 (2003): 537–562; Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton.
The Regional City (Island Press, 2001); Peter Dreier, John H.
Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom. Place Matters: Metropolitics
for the Twenty-First Century (University Press of Kansas, 2004);
Howell-Moroney. ‘‘The Tiebout Hypothesis’’; Daniel J. Hutch.
‘‘The Rationale for Including Disadvantaged Communities in the
Smart Growth Metropolitan Development Framework.’’ Yale Law
& Policy Review 20 (2002): 353–368; Russell P. Lopez and H.
Patricia Hynes. ‘‘Obesity, Physical Activity, and the Urban En-
vironment: Public Health Research Needs.’’ Environmental Health
5 (2006): 1; Orfield. American Metropolitics; Orfield. Must We
Bus?; Edward W. Soja. ‘‘Regional Urbanization and the End of the
Metropolis Era.’’ In: Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, eds., The
New Blackwell Companion to the City (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011),
679–689.
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regions such as Flint will, at best, face the rising costs of
service provision for declining and inadequate infrastruc-
ture and, at worst, endure additional, and perhaps even
more catastrophic, public health crises.
APPROXIMATE PERIODIZATION OF MAJOR
EVENTS PRECIPITATING THE FWC
Industrial Growth (1910s–1945)
Post-World War II Development (1945–1960)
New Flint and Regionalism (1958–1970s)
Civil Rights and Deindustrialization (1968–1980s)
Contemporary Disinvestment (1990s–Present).
AUTHOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No competing financial interests exist.
Address correspondence to:
Richard Casey Sadler
Division of Public Health
Michigan State University
200 East 1st Street Room 337
Flint, MI 48502
E-mail: sadlerr@msu.edu
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE FLINT WATER CRISIS 151
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n 
e-
jou
rna
l p
ack
ag
e f
rom
 on
lin
e.l
ieb
ert
pu
b.c
om
 at
 12
/08
/17
. F
or 
pe
rso
na
l u
se 
on
ly.
 
This article has been cited by:
1. Alison Singer, Steven Gray, Artina Sadler, Laura Schmitt Olabisi, Kyle Metta, Renee Wallace, Maria Claudia Lopez, Josh Introne,
Maddie Gorman, Jane Henderson. 2017. Translating community narratives into semi-quantitative models to understand the
dynamics of socio-environmental crises. Environmental Modelling & Software 97, 46-55. [Crossref]
2. Richard C. Sadler, Don J. Lafreniere. 2017. You are where you live: Methodological challenges to measuring children’s exposure
to hazards. Journal of Children and Poverty 23:2, 189-198. [Crossref]
3. Michael B. Rosen, Lok R. Pokhrel, Mark H. Weir. 2017. A discussion about public health, lead and Legionella pneumophila in
drinking water supplies in the United States. Science of The Total Environment 590-591, 843-852. [Crossref]
4. Richard Casey Sadler, Jesenia Pizarro, Brandon Turchan, Stephen P. Gasteyer, Edmund F. McGarrell. 2017. Exploring the spatial-
temporal relationships between a community greening program and neighborhood rates of crime. Applied Geography 83, 13-26.
[Crossref]
5. Richard Casey Sadler, Jenny LaChance, Mona Hanna-Attisha. 2017. Social and Built Environmental Correlates of Predicted
Blood Lead Levels in the Flint Water Crisis. American Journal of Public Health 107:5, 763-769. [Crossref]
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f M
ic
hi
ga
n 
e-
jou
rna
l p
ack
ag
e f
rom
 on
lin
e.l
ieb
ert
pu
b.c
om
 at
 12
/08
/17
. F
or 
pe
rso
na
l u
se 
on
ly.
 
